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FEDERAL AGENCY PUBLICATIONs: THE AvAILABirrY OF
JuDIcIAL REVIEW
Assume that ABC, a federal administrative agency, publishes an evalu-
ation of the widget industry.I The report lists and ranks the ten best
widgets. Many widget consumers use the agency's industry evaluation in
their purchasing decisions. May XYZ, the manufacturer of the agency's
tenth-ranked widget seek relief from the government for decreased sales
resulting from ABC's publication?2 Specifically, is the agency's decision
to publish the evaluation subject to judicial review?
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA or the Act)3 provides an ag-
grieved party4 the right to judicial review of a final agency action.5 A
1. Agencies often publicize evaluations of industries and products pursuant to statutory man-
date. See, eg., The Consumer Product Safety Commission Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b) (1988)
(commission must "protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury" and "assist consumers in
evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products"); The Public Health Service Act § 301, 42
U.S.C. § 242 (1988) (Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare must issue "information related to
public health, in the form of publications or otherwise, for the use of the public," and inform the
public of "other pertinent health information for the use of persons and institutions concerned with
health services"); Public Health Service Act § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 241(b)(4) (1988) (the Department of
Health and Human Services must classify chemicals according to their carcinogenic danger and
publish an annual report containing its findings); The National Highway Traffic Safety Act § 1, 15
U.S.C. § 1381 (1988) (defect notification practices); The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act
§§ 1, 705, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 375 (1988) ("The Secretary may cause to be disseminated information
regarding food, drugs, devices or cosmetics in situations involving ... danger to health or gross
deception of the consumer").
2. The potential effects of agency publicity can be devastating. For example, shortly before
Thanksgiving of 1959, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), as overseer of the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), announced that cranberries from Washington and Oregon
might contain a weed killer found to have caused cancer in laboratory rats. Ernest Gellhorn, Ad-
verse Publicity in Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1380, 1408 (1983). However, no spe-
cific scientific evidence suggested humans similarly might suffer from eating cranberries. HEW
subsequently approved almost all cranberries as safe for human consumption. The holiday had
passed, however, and 99% of the year's crop went unsold. Id. at 1408. Congress later reimbursed
the cranberry growers for most of their lost sales in response to intense industry and political pres-
sure. Id. at 1409 & n. 118. The Administrative Conference of the United States has recognized
officially that an agency's use of the media sometimes may cause unfair injury. The Conference
concluded that such adverse publicity is undesirable when it is erroneous or excessive. See Adverse
Agency Publicity, I C.F.R. § 305.73-1 (1991) (Recommendation No. 73-1).
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1988) (originally enacted in 1946).
4. To be "aggrieved" the party must demonstrate: 1) an injury in fact, and 2) that the party's
interests are arguably within the zone of interests intended for protection by the relevant statute. See
Association of Data Processing v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Lost sales resulting from adverse
publicity in an agency publication may fulfill the injury requirement. See Synthetic Organic Chem.
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party must establish two conditions before review is available.6 First, the
agency's decision to publish must come within the Act's definition of
"agency action."7 Second, the agency action must be final and otherwise
ripe for review.' Most courts refuse to review agencies' published indus-
try evaluations despite the potential economic harm to a party in XYZ's
position.9 Nevertheless, there is an alternative judicial analysis that al-
lows review. 10
Part I of this Note surveys traditional judicial approaches to determin-
ing the reviewability of an agency's industry evaluation. Part II presents
an alternative line of reasoning that allows judicial review. Part III
surveys several arguments in favor of judicial review. The Note con-
cludes that when an agency's published industry evaluation harms a pro-
ducer, that producer deserves judicial attention.
I. A SURVEY OF JUDICIAL VIEWS ON THE REVIEWABILITY OF
AGENCY PUBLICATIONS
The Supreme Court has held that the APA's review provisions must be
given a "hospitable interpretation."" In addition, the APA's legislative
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Secretary, Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 720 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (W.D. La.
1989).
5. "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
However, only "[a]gency action made reviewable by statute [or] final agency action.., are subject to
judicial review." 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1988) (emphasis added).
6. The APA, however, excepts from review general statements of policy, interpretative rules,
and rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A) (1988). See also
infra note 24.
7. "Agency action" includes "the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction,
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act .... 5 U.S.C. § 551 (13) (1988).
8. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ripeness issues that
arise when a court considers review of an agency's publication of an industry evaluation. Although
not essential, finality is a primary ingredient of ripeness. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S,
136, 148-49 (1967). Courts hesitate to provide relief unless the controversy in question is "ripe for
judicial resolution." The ripeness doctrine enables courts to avoid entangling themselves in prema-
ture adjudications. Id. Courts carefully must avoid deciding still-abstract issues and should "pro-
tect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and
its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Id. See also Williamson City Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 192 (1985) ("finality requirement is concerned
with whether the decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an
actual, concrete injury").
9. See infra notes 36-46, 56-59, 61-66 and accompanying text.
10. Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Secretary, Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 720
F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. La. 1989). See infra notes 122-42.
11. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 141 (citing Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51
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history impliedly favors review,12 stating that courts should limit their
review only when "clear and convincing" evidence suggests a statutory
intent to withhold review.13 Moreover, the Supreme Court has adopted a
presumption in favor of reviewability.14
In determinations of the reviewability of an agency's published indus-
try evaluation, however, a strong public policy favoring the dissemina-
tion of important information, i.e., the "public's right to know," often
outweighs the presumption in favor of judicial review.15 Agency public-
ity may serve to warn consumers of potential industrial hazards, inform
both the public and regulated parties of agency policy and goals, or deter
(1955)). See also United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1949) (dis-
trict court has jurisdiction to review United States' shipper's claim against Interstate Commerce
Commission denial of reparations to the government from independent wharfs); American Friends
Serv. Comm'n v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (district court has jurisdiction to review
agency action in connection with FBI record disposal); Hondros v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 720 F.2d 278, 292 (3d Cir. 1981) (courts can review United States Marshal's Service dis-
cretion to request eligibility certificates for considering reinstatement of former deputy).
12. See, e.g., Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)
("We begin with the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative
action."); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) ("our cases [show] that judicial
review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive
reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress"); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249
1st Cir. 1970) (court recognizes strong presumption in favor of review in granting hearing to low-
income tenants challenging FHA approval of rent hike).
13.
To preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific in withholding such
review, must upon its face give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it.
The mere failure to provide specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence
of intent to withhold review.
H.R. RE'. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946). See also Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986) (citing Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467, U.S.
340, 345 (1984)) (foreign association has private cause of action to challenge moratorium on com-
mercial whaling within United States); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
410 (1971) (no indication that Congress intended to limit or prohibit judicial review of Department
of Transportation decision to build highway through park); Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 140 n.2
(Court granted pre-enforcement review of FDA regulations requiring that prescription drug labels
carry the corresponding generic name that HEW designates); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80
(1962) (APA review available to person outside the United States denied right of citizenship); Louis
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 336-59 (1965).
14. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) ("We begin
with the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action.").
15. Gellhorn, supra note 2, at 1382-83 (publicizing administrative programs and opinions
achieves fairness, anticipating questions saves time, advance notice leads to increased compliance
with new policies); Illinois Citizens Comm'n for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir.
1975) ("the [Supreme] Court reaffirmed 'the right of the public to be informed' ") (quoting CBS v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)).
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private industry from taking unfavorable actions.' 6 Often, an agency ex-
ists to disseminate health and safety warnings.' 7 In fact, the powers of
many agencies "would be crippled were those agencies not permitted to
use the quick and cheap instrument of publicity."' 8
The balancing of the public's right to know against the presumption of
review is important in determining whether an agency's publication deci-
sion constitutes final agency action under the APA. The "right to know"
concern supports delaying or refusing review of agency publications, thus
allowing for quick dissemination of information. On the other hand, the
favored status of judicial review suggests the need for immediate judicial
review to protect the adversely affected party's interests in accuracy and
fairness. 19
Judicial analysis of the reviewability of published administrative evalu-
ations thus proceeds on a fact-dependent, case-by-case basis.20 Judicial
analyses tend to focus on factors such as the agency publication's timing
and subsequent or potential impact, the nature of the action, and the
agency's characterization of the action. 2 Agencies may characterize
16. Gellhorn, supra note 2, at 1382-83.
17. See supra note 1 (describing agencies' statutory mandates regarding the dissemination of
important information). See also Gellhorn, supra note 2, at 1383. The benefits of information on
health dangers are apparent. However, Gellhom points out that problems can arise in balancing
potential harm against the substantial negative effects an unfounded warning might cause. Id. at
1413. See supra note 2.
18. Industrial Safety Equip. Ass'n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
19. Id. at 1117. See also JACoB A. STEIN ET AL., 5 ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW § 43.01 (1991). In
addition to determining review of agency publication of industry evaluations, courts may confront
agency press releases that affect one particular manufacturer, general agency adjudications that may
injure the losing party economically, and agency proclamations that harm sales of either a particular
producer or an entire industry. Id.
20. STEIN, supra note 19, at 1117.
21. Courts often vary in the weight they place on an agency's characterization of its own ac-
tions. See generally CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942) ("It is the substance of what the
[agency] has purported to do and has done which is decisive."); United States Dep't of Labor v. Kast
Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1149 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[Tlhis court is not bound by an administrative
agency's classification of its own action.... [A]n agency cannot outflank either the strictures of its
enabling legislation or the APA's rulemaking framework by definitional fiat .... [T]he substance,
not the label, is determinative"); Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 816 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) ("an announcement is not necessarily a policy statement because the agency has so labeled
it"); Chamber of Commerce of United States v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The
administrative agency's own label is indicative but not dispositive"); Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of
Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 481-82 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The label that the particular agency puts upon its given
exercise of administrative power is not.., conclusive; rather it is what the agency does in fact"); Sea-
Land Serv., Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 402 F.2d 631, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("The Commis-
sion has termed the decision contested by appellant a 'report.' But its label is not conclusive, and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss4/9
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their publications as a rule,22 a sanction, 23 or, most often, a general pol-
icy statement.24 Finally, courts emphasize different aspects of an
agency's decision to publish an industry evaluation.
A. The Reviewability of Agencies' Published Recommendations and the
APA's Definition of "Agency Action"
Soon after Congress enacted the APA in 1946, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the Act's defi-
nition of "agency action"2 in Hearst Radio, Inc. v. FCC.26 In Hearst
Radio, a radio station contended that an FCC-published report con-
tained false accusations, causing "direct damage and prejudice" to its
reputation.27 The court, however, took a narrow view of the APA's defi-
nition of "agency action." It held that the Act did not provide judicial
review of the report at hand, because the term "agency action"28 is not
what is decisive is the substance of what it has done."). But see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Often the agency's own characterization of a
particular order provides some indication of the nature of the announcement"); Community Nutri-
tion Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("We consider and give some, albeit not
overwhelming, deference to an agency's characterization of its statement."); Bellarno Int'l. Ltd. v.
FDA, 678 F. Supp. 410, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("IThe court must give deference to an agency's own
characterization of the pronouncement").
22. The APA's definition of "agency action" includes rulemaking. See supra note 7. The APA
defines a rule as the:
whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization,
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription
for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof,
prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefore or of valuations, costs, or ac-
counting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing.
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988).
23. The APA's definition of "agency action" includes sanction. See supra note 7. The APA
defines "sanction" to include "the whole or part of an agency prohibition, requirement, limitation, or
other condition affecting the freedom of a person, or taking other compulsory or restrictive action."
5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988).
24. The APA excepts an agency's general policy statements from its definition of rulemaking,
thus precluding judicial review of such statements. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (1988). This Note as-
sumes that whether an agency's promulgation is a mere general policy statement is considered only
after a judicial finding regarding reviewability.
25. See supra note 7.
26. 167 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
27. Id. at 226. The FCC published a report entitled "Public Service Responsibility of Broad-
cast Licensees," commonly known as the "Blue Book." Parts of the Blue Book alleged that one of
the plaintiff's stations, WBAL had unethically procured a broadcast channel. The plaintiff argued
that the Blue Book's accusations destroyed public confidence in its station and created difficulties
when the plaintiff applied for a renewal of its broadcast license. Id.
28. See supra note 7.
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"all-embracive." 29 Accordingly, the court held that the FCC's publica-
tion was not "agency action."3 °
The Hearst court's doctrine of strict unreviewability remained undis-
turbed for more than thirty years.31 In Impro Products, Inc. v. Block, 2
however, the court explained that courts had expanded the phrase
"agency action" over the years to include situations that the Hearst court
had not considered.33 Thus the petitioner's claim that a USDA report
contained misleading test findings might give rise to reviewable "agency
action" within the APA, even in the face of the government's argument
to the contrary.34 Plaintiffs' claims would be strong particularly when
agencies publish concededly false information.35
L The Reviewability of an Agency Publication as a "Rule" Within
the APA
Under the APA, agency rules are subject to judicial review.36 There-
fore, in releasing information on industries or parties, agencies often at-
tempt to sidestep review by characterizing their actions as something
29. 167 F.2d at 227 ("The term 'agency action' is not a general term with the all-embracing
meaning usually conveyed by those words, but is a term defined in the statute"). The Hearst court
also emphasized the specific language of the APA in defining agency action. Id. See also supra note
7.
30. 167 F.2d at 227. Nevertheless, this finding conflicts with portions of the APA's legislative
history. "The term 'agency action' brings together previously defined terms in order to simplify the
language of the judicial-review provisions of section 10 [of the APA] and to assure the complete
coverage of every form of agency power, proceeding, action, or inaction." S. Doc. No. 248, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (1946). See also FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239 n.7 (1980).
31. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated the Hearst rule in 1975. See
Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (agency action is
unreviewable where it does not impose obligations or fix legal rights).
32. 722 F.2d 845, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The plaintiff had applied for renewal of a license to
produce and ship interstate a health antibody for cows. In reviewing Impro's application, the USDA
tested the antibody and determined that it was ineffective. Id. at 847. The USDA scientists widely
distributed copies of an article in which they explained their findings. Impro maintained that the
USDA findings were false and impeded Impro's ability to market its antibody. Id.
33. Id. The court referred, as an example, to FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 440 U.S. 232, 238 n.7
(1980), wherein the Supreme Court held that the issuance of a complaint qualifies as "agency action"
within the APA. Any doubt the court expressed about the continuing validity of the Hearst ration-
ale was dictum. Id. ("we will defer any reexamination of Hearst Radio to another day").
34. Id. This action was the result of long-protracted litigation. The government counter-
claimed that Impro had sold its product interstate without the requisite license. Id.
35. 722 F.2d at 849. The court explained that the publication of concededly false information
would be contrary to the mandate of an agency's enacting legislation. Id.
36. Rules, by definition, constitute agency action within the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (13)
(1988). See also supra note 7.
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other than rules. Courts generally respect these interpretations. 37
For example, in Industrial Safety Equipment Association (ISEA) v.
EPA," the EPA cosponsored a technical report39 recommending indus-
try use of only two of thirteen federally certified asbestos protection res-
pirators.' The eleven affected manufacturers argued that the report
constituted an agency rule,4 1 charging that the report effectively "decer-
tified"42 their products and would result in significant economic
hardship.43
The District of Columbia Circuit held, however, that the report did
not constitute rulemaking because it merely ranked and recommended
respirators.' The court noted that the report intended only to advise,
inform, and provide a model for asbestos respiration. 45 The court thus
37. Agencies often characterize their published recommendations as one of the APA's excep-
tions to rulemaking, which do not constitute agency action and which are thus unreviewable. See
supra note 6. See e.g., Bellarno Int'l Ltd. v. FDA, 678 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (published
"import alert" that blocked importation of pharmaceutical characterized as "interpretative rule");
Dow Chem. v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n, 459 F. Supp. 348 (W.D. La. 1978) (action to
classify allegedly carcinogenic substances called "interim regulations"). But see Synthetic Organic
Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Secretary, Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 720 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. La.
1989) (criteria for classifying chemicals as carcinogenic characterized as a "report" but held review-
able as agency action); Nader v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 657 F.2d 453, 454-57 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Board guidelines constitute agency rule subject to judicial review where guidelines, more than mere
policy statement, limit agency's future discretion) (citing Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
38. 837 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
39. Id. at 1116. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) cosponsored the report. Id.
40. Id. at 1116-17. Federal regulations require the EPA and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, which administers NIOSH, to safeguard employees from dangerous health
hazards that asbestos exposure caused. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (1986); 40 C.F.R.
§ 763.21(d) (1988)). Respirators include "air purifying" types, used mostly under low-level asbestos
conditions and "supplied-air" types, the most effective protection. The EPA/NIOSH report recom-
mended only the two supplied-air respirators, despite federal certification of all thirteen devices. Id.
41. Id. at 1119. ISEA alleged that, because no notice and comment occurred prior to the EPA
adopting this substantive rule, the court should hold the report invalid. Id.
42. The report used quite strong language in distinguishing among the respirators: "The respi-
rator types numbered 3 through 13 above are not recommended by NIOSH or EPA for use against
asbestos. However, various existing regulations allow their use.... [Als a matter of public health
policy, NIOSH and EPA do not recommend their use in asbestos environments." Id. at 1117.
43. The petitioners alleged that the report would harm the makers of the excluded respirators.
Id. at 1116. Furthermore, the complainants charged that the report left them vulnerable to products
liability claims. Telephone interview with Jim Spoole, Manager of CB North, Charleston, S.C.
(member of petitioner/association) (February 8, 1991).
44. 827 F.2d at 1119-21.
45. Id. The court stated that the report "emphasizes throughout that the model is an ideal
[only], not a regimen presently mandated by law." Id. at 1120. The court also pointed to another
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dismissed ISEA's hardship claim, refusing to find "agency action" solely
because the report affected petitioners' sales.46
2. The Reviewability of Agency Publications Based on Their Impact
on Private Parties
In determining reviewability of most agency actions, courts usually
look beyond the agency's label to the substance of the action. 47 How-
ever, within the context of agency publications, courts generally defer to
the agency's interpretation of its action and thus hesitate to grant judicial
review.
a. The Reviewability of an Agency Publication Based on Whether
the Publication Fixes the Regulated Party's Legal Rights
Reviewability of an administrative publication as "agency action"
within the APA may turn on whether the action imposes obligations on,
or fixes the legal rights of, affected parties.48 Courts often face only two
options: 1) grant review of a seemingly innocuous agency promulgation,
or 2) stand by as the petitioner suffers significant losses due to the agency
promulgation.
In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (B & W) v. FTC,4 9 the FTC
section of the report in which NIOSH/EPA explicitly stated that the less efficient brands of respira-
tors fulfill both agencies' specifications. Id. at 1121. But cf Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Secretary, Dep't. of Health and Human Servs., 720 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (W.D. La. 1989) (govern-
ment report intended merely to inform and educate constitutes agency action under the APA).
46. 837 F.2d at 1121. ("We note first that this court has rejected the notion that the mere fact
that an agency action has 'substantial impact' transform[s] it into a legislative rule.") (citing Ameri-
can Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984)). See infra notes 90-121 and accompanying text for a discussion of
judicial consideration of the impact of agency promulgations on private parties and the availability
of judicial review.
The court again did not address whether the intentional dissemination of false information consti-
tutes agency action subject to review. 837 F.2d at 1121 n.10 ("Because ISEA does not attack the
Guide as false or misleading, we need not decide the question."). See supra notes 32-35 and accom-
panying text.
47. STEIN, supra note 19, at § 43.01. See supra note 21.
48. STEIN, supra note 19, at § 43.01, n.12. See also Illinois Citizens Comm'n for Broadcasting
v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (FCC fine of licensee for broadcasting obscene material fixed
legal rights and obligations in its refusal to withdraw its Notice of Liability); American Trucking
Ass'n v. United States, 755 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1985) (ICC report on trucking industry deregulation
did not fix legal rights or impose obligations on trucking industry members). Whether legal rights
are fixed or obligations are imposed is also important in determining whether an agency action is
final and ripe for review. See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
49. 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
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proposed changes in its tobacco industry report that effectively barred B
& W from continuing its advertising campaign of "low-tar" cigarettes. 50
B & W sought judicial review of the FTC's proposed evaluation, which
the FTC planned to publish in the Federal Register.51 The FTC argued
that its proposed publication was neither an order nor a rule and thus did
not constitute a reviewable agency action under the APA.5 2
The Sixth Circuit found that this announcement was alone not subject
to review. 3 However, it also noted that the FTC subsequently refused
either to test B & W cigarettes or to publish tar levels for B & W brands,
and that the FTC amended its 1981 Report to reflect this change in atti-
tude.54 The court found that, although the FTC may not have labeled its
action an "order" or "rule," it effectively fixed B & W's rights, barring B
& W from making a "low-tar" claim; the court held that this amounted
to "agency action."55
b. Reviewability of Agency Publications in Light of the Agency's
Intent
Reviewability of an agency promulgation based on its impact may also
50. 710 F.2d at 1168-70. The FTC had operated a laboratory in which it performed tests on
tobacco products. Since the laboratory's inception in 1967, the government had released its findings
to the public in periodic reports. Id. at 1168. In 1971, the tobacco industry agreed to advertise the
government's data so that consumers could compare fairly the tar levels of various brands. In re-
sponse to a complaint by R.J. Reynolds, the FTC conducted a year-long study that concluded that
the FTC's testing method did not accurately measure the tar level of B & W's cigarette brands. Id.
The FTC refused to publish tar data for B & W cigarettes in its 1981 tobacco report and thus
precluded the company from advertising its brands as "low-tar," jeopardizing its market share and
causing potentially significant losses. Id. at 1168.
51. Id. at 1167. The proposed statement read:
(1) the FTC has concluded that its present testing methodology does not accurately as-
sess the "tar" and nicotine yields of B & W's Barclay cigarettes;
(2) the FTC's December, 1981 Report, which stated that the "tar" yield of Barclay ciga-
rettes is 1 mg., is inaccurate and should be corrected;
(3) pending a revision in the test methodology, future FTC reports, if any, will not in-
clude results for Barclay cigarettes. ...
Id.
52. The FTC analogized its action to generally unreviewable actions like the announcement of
an investigation or the issuance of a complaint. Id. at 1170. The commission also contended that
the proposed publication constituted merely a statement of future policy, and that even if it did
qualify as agency action, lack of finality precluded review. Id. at 1169.
53. Id. The court subscribed to the FTC's position only in regard to the commission's release
of its reservations about B & W brands.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1170. ("it would now appear to be inappropriate for [B & W] to continue to cite the
figures in the 1981 Report in its Barclay advertisements").
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turn on the intent with which the agency acted. For example, in Ameri-
can Trucking Association (ATA) v. United States,5 6 the plaintiffs chal-
lenged an Interstate Commerce Commission report on the economic
impact of deregulation in the trucking industry during the 1970s and
1980s.11 ATA asserted that the report would adversely affect truckers'
interests.a8 The Seventh Circuit, however, found that the commission
intended the report to be primarily educational or informative of the cur-
rent state of affairs. The court held such a promulgation unreviewable in
these circumstances.59
c. Distinguishing Reviewability Based on the Actual Source of the
Hardship on Private Parties
Agencies sometimes defend against claims of economic injury resulting
from agency publications by arguing that their involvement is removed
from the party's harm, blaming the independent choices of third parties,
consumers, as the cause of the complainant's injury.
56. 755 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1985).
57. Id. at 1293. In response to a regulatory shift, the ICC re-evaluated its practice of tightly
controlling prices in the trucking industry. The commission decided to afford greater weight to the
benefits of free competition and, in some instances, openly encouraged competition. Congress re-
acted to this new attitude by enacting the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat.
793. The Act codified the ICC's already-relaxed standards on motor carrier pricing. 755 F.2d at
1293. Unfortunately, the early 1980s economic recession ensued, resulting in severe price cutting
and increased competition. Id. at 1295. An association of motor carriers petitioned the ICC for
industry standards that more precisely defined predatory pricing so the ICC could more easily iden-
tify violators. Instead, the commission responded with a vague report concluding that individual
motor carriers' price cuts should not be suspended pending investigation of alleged predatory compe-
tition. Id.
58. Id. The report stated that predatory pricing was difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish
in the trucking industry; that the failure of some motor carriers due to increased competition was not
necessarily contrary to the public interest; and that individual price cuts should not be suspended
pending investigation of charges of predatory pricing. Id.
59. Id. at 1296-97. The court stated that the report intended to promote "a greater understand-
ing.., of the pricing techniques now being developed by the trucking industry." Id. at 1296 (quot-
ing the ICC's report, PRICING PRACTICES OF MOTOR COMMON CARRIERS OF PROPERTY SINCE
THE MOTOR CARRIER ACT OF 1980, Ex PARTE MC-166 (1983), at I). The court further found that
the ICC did not intend the report to fix any of the association's legal rights. Id. at 1297. See also
IT&T v. IBEW Local 134, 419 U.S. 428, 441 (1975) (National Labor Relations Act provision mak-
ing labor union's inducement to strike an unfair labor practice not final because it failed to force
anyone to do anything).
Some courts, however, have found agency action where the agency used a publication as a "regu-
latory pressure mechanism." See Writer's Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064
(C.D. Cal. 1976) (reviewable agency action where agency official gave opinion in official capacity
using language intended as a "regulatory pressure mechanism").
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In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) v. Kennedy,'
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) contended that its compari-
son of generic and brand name drugs did not obligate industry members
to take any action.6' The FDA asserted that it intended the guide merely
to educate and inform consumers.62 PMA complained, however, that
the comparison guide provided irrelevant and inaccurate information,
and that its publication would cause consumers to switch to less expen-
sive generic brands.63 The court, however, found no agency action, stat-
ing that any effect on the sales of the brand name drugs due to the guide's
dissemination resulted primarily from independent consumer decisions."
The PMA court also rejected the petitioner's analogy of their situation
to "reverse-Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)" cases in which a man-
ufacturer who has submitted required information to an agency seeks to
block release of that information.6" The PMA court distinguished the
facts of this case from situations in which courts generally hold informa-
tion release in reverse-FOIA cases reviewable as agency action.66
d. Reviewability Based on an Agency's "Moral Suasion"
Measuring the impact of agency action to determine reviewability can
be extremely subjective. A court may find that an agency report's
"moral suasion" makes the report rise to the level of reviewable "agency
action." The seminal case in this regard is Air Line Pilots' Association
International v. FAA ,67 in which a pilots' association sought judicial re-
view of an FAA determination that a proposed high-rise complex in Dal-
60. 471 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Md. 1979).
61. Id. at 1225. The Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Health and
Human Services published the Report.
62. Id. at 1230-31.
63, Id. at 1225. PMA asserted that it would suffer because consumers would not buy drugs
from PMA members with cheaper generics available. PMA members thus would lose profits they
otherwise would have earned.
64. Id. at 1231-33. Thus the distance placed between the agency's action and the complainants'
harm caused the study's failure to constitute agency action.
65. Id. at 1229. Courts have found that an agency's release of information in this context
constitutes agency action. Id.
66. See infra notes 146-59. The court attempted to distinguish reverse-FOIA cases: 1) unlike
PMA, reverse-FOIA plaintiffs submitted the information to the agency with the hope or belief that
the information would remain confidential; and 2) PMA has not suffered a "legal wrong," required
for review in a reverse-FOIA situation. 471 F. Supp. at 1229. See infra notes 146-59 and accompa-
nying text.
67, 446 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1971).
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las would not constitute a navigational hazard.68 The FAA argued that
its ruling did not explicitly forbid construction of the high-rise complex
and thus did not fix or affect any legal rights. 69 The FAA further as-
serted that its ruling's power lay only in its "moral suasion" on the build-
ers of the complex.70 The court, however, rejected the FAA's claim,
noting that "moral suasion" can have an effect sufficient to warrant im-
mediate judicial review. 7
B. Finality Analysis of Agency Promulgations of Industry
Recommendations
If the court finds "agency action," it next examines whether the action
is final and ripe72 for judicial review.73 Availability of review to the hy-
pothetical widget manufacturer depends, in part, on ABC's timing in
promulgating the widget report and the judiciary's ability to attack the
dispute at this stage of the game.
In the leading ripeness case, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,74 the
Supreme Court explained that the ripeness doctrine exists "to prevent the
courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and
also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administra-
68. Id. at 237. The decision reversed an earlier finding that the proposed buildings would
indeed constitute hazard to navigation. Specifically, the pilots' association argued that the FAA's
determination afforded no opportunity for prior notice and comment. Id. The Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1432 (1988), empowers the FAA Administrator to regulate air naviga-
tion to ensure safety. The Administrator can review proposals to construct tall buildings and struc-
tures in and around airports. See 446 F.2d at 237.
69. 446 F.2d at 240. The FAA quoted the 1947 Supreme Court opinion in Chicago & Southern
Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1947): "Administrative orders are
not reviewable unless and until they impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship
as a consummation of the administrative process." 446 F.2d at 240. The agency argued that their
determination of whether a hazard existed had no enforceable effect. Id.
70. 446 F.2d at 240.
71. Id. at 241 ("it takes little knowledge of the goings-on about us to be aware that 'moral
suasion' is a potent force in our society"). Moreover, the court followed recently relaxed ripeness
tests. Id. at 242. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
72. The ripeness doctrine derives from Article III of the Constitution, which restricts the judi-
ciary to consideration of "cases and controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, c1. 1.
73. See supra note 5. For a thorough discussion of the ripeness doctrine, see Gene R. Nichol,
Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1987); R. George Wright, The Timing of
Judicial Review and Administrative Decisions: The Use and Abuse ofOverlapping Doctrines, II Am.
J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 83 (1987).
74. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss4/9
1991] FEDERAL AGENCY PUBLICATIONS 1279
tive decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by
the challenging parties.""5
Although a complaining manufacturer may assert that it can deter-
mine easily the report's effect on daily business,76 courts rarely step in
where they believe the eventually necessary relief may be too difficult to
ascertain. Courts generally prefer to await further developments in order
to render a more accurate decision."'
Within the context of this Note, analysis of reviewability centers on
two aspects of ripeness:78 whether the issues are appropriate for judicial
review,79 and whether the parties would suffer hardship if judicial consid-
eration were denied."0 Determining ripeness of an agency's published
evaluative study generally involves three factors: 1) whether the issues
are purely legal;8" 2) whether resolution of the issues will foster judicial
efficiency;82 and 3) whether the plaintiffs' harm from the agency action is
sufficiently direct and immediate to warrant review at the publication
75. Id. at 148-49.
76. Id. at 153. See also Cowdin v. Young, 681 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. La. 1987) (veterinarians
allege that FDA policy guide "constitutes an unauthorized intrusion in [their] day-to-day practice");
Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Ken-
nedy, 471 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Md. 1979) (No. 4-78-2449).
77. See ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCESS IN A
NUTSHELL, 384 (1990); KENNETH C. DAVIS, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 405 (2d ed. 1983); G. Jo-
seph Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L.
REV. 1443 (1971). But see Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1170-71
(6th Cir. 1983) (cigarette manufacturer's pre-enforcement challenge to FDA's proposed changes in
tar-level testing are immediately reviewable), cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
78. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149.
79. Id. This question often turns on whether an action is sufficiently definite or final to warrant
review. Continental Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 522 F.2d 113, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en
bane) ("The interest in postponing review is strong if the agency position ... is not in fact the
agency's final position. If the position is likely to be abandoned or modified before [becoming effec-
tive] then its review wastes the court's time and interferes with the process by which the agency is
attempting to reach a final decision."); Louisiana v. Dep't of Energy, 507 F. Supp. 1365, 1371 (W.D.
La. 1981) ("An agency position is clearly final agency action.., where it will not be the subject of
any further proceedings at the agency.") (parenthesis omitted) (citing Ecee, Inc. v. FERC, 611 F.2d
554, 557 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 690 F.2d 180 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1069 (1983)).
80. 387 U.S. at 149. See also Continental Air Lines, 522 F.2d at 124-25 (ripeness requires "that
the interests of the court and the agency in postponing review... be outweighed by the interests of
those who seek relief from the challenged action's 'immediate and practical impact' upon them")
(quoting Frozen Foods Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 41 (1956)). Accord Cowdin v. Young,
681 F. Supp. 366, 367 (W.D. La. 1987).
81. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149.
82. Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1967).
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stage. 3
1. Whether the Agency's Decision to Publish is a Purely Legal
Matter
In situations similar to that of the hypothetical widget-maker, statutes
often require that agencies publish. 84 Thus, reviewability may turn on
how a court interprets the agency's enabling statute. In practice, courts
vary considerably in the weight they place on statutory construction.
Some treat it only as a threshold issue,85 others treat it as a determinative
issue."6 For example, in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC,87
the petitioner alleged that the FTC failed to follow APA rulemaking pro-
cedure when it in announced the end of testing and publication of tar-
level figures for the tobacco company's cigarettes.8 8 The court found the
matter purely legal in nature, requiring no further fact-finding, because
the agency intended no further consideration of the announcement before
83. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 152-53.
84. See supra note I.
85. See Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162 (1967) (Supreme Court refuses to
review concededly "legal" issue on lack of ripeness grounds); Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Costle,
580 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Although appellants' challenges to the regulations can be
considered as raising issues which are for the most part 'legal,' that characterization does not end the
inquiry.").
86. See Alascom, Inc. v. FCC, 727 F.2d 1212, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("If, however, 'the issue is
a purely legal one,' in which no further facts need be developed to facilitate a proper judicial deci-
sion, a final agency action may be fit for judicial review even though it has never been applied or
enforced by the agency in a concrete setting.") (emphasis added) (citing Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S.
at 164); Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil and Gas, 792 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1986)
("Review is not premature if the agency action is . . . 'purely legal'."). See also Fed-
eral/Postal/Retiree Coalition A.F.G.E. v. Devine, 751 F.2d 1424, 1426 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Office of
Personnel Management publication of intent to promulgate guidelines for dissemination to adminis-
trative agencies reviewable, despite no actual publication of the manual, because the matter
"squarely presented for resolution the legal issue 'whether OPM has authority to issue the policy
guidelines as a whole' "); Texas v. United States Dep't of Energy, 764 F.2d 278, 283-84 (5th Cir.)
(challenged action not ripe because issues not solely legal and action does not have requisite direct
and immediate impact on petitioners), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1008 (1985).
In Credit Union Nat'l Ass'n v. National Credit Union Admin. Bd., 573 F. Supp. 586 (D.D.C.
1983), the plaintiff contended that the Board failed to comply with the APA's notice-and-comment
requirements for informal rulemaking. Id. at 588. The Board had issued a statement describing its
priorities in setting a payout schedule for involuntarily insolvent credit unions. Id. The court held
that whether the Board should have followed APA procedure presented purely legal issues because it
entailed only an interpretation of the Board's statutory authority to issue such statements. Id. at
590. Therefore, the petitioner's claim merited immediate review. Id.
87. 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
88. Id. at 1171.
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the report would affect B & W.89
2. Reviewability Analysis and the Effect on Efficiency
Courts also focus on whether review of the agency's publication action
will interfere with judicial efficiency.90 Like the "purely legal" aspect of
the ripeness debate, judicial efficiency alone does not often determine re-
viewability for two reasons. First, courts generally proceed on a case-by-
case basis when determining whether to review an agency's publication
of an industry evaluation.91 Thus, review of a single promulgation gener-
ally will not chill an agency from making further promulgations because
judicial analysis of the reviewability of the agency's actions will be fact-
specific. Second, courts hesitate to interfere prematurely if the issues are
not purely legal in nature.92 Forbearance can allow courts to balance the
need for judicial deference to administrative primacy against the ag-
grieved party's need for relief. Courts that wait to measure the promul-
gation's concrete effects will not be forced to theorize about the existence,
cause, or degree of impact, particularly when the harm results from
third-party actions,93 such as consumers' choices.
3. The Effect of the Directness and Immediacy of Harm to Private
Parties from Agency Publications
The most contentious aspect of finality analysis centers on whether the
regulated party's injury is sufficiently direct, immediate, and substantial
to warrant immediate review.94 Two general perspectives exist: some
courts emphasize the complainant's suffering,9" while others focus on the
speculative nature of the complainant's injury.96
The former group generally takes a more sympathetic view of the in-
89. Id.
90. See FTC v. Standard Oil, 449 U.S. 232, 239-43 (1980) (immediate judicial review of com-
plaint would serve neither efficiency nor enforcement of the act); Credit Union Nat'l Ass'n, 573 F.
Supp. at 590 (resolving the validity of Board's decision at once rather than waiting to rule in subse-
quent specific situations serves efficiency); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 402 F.
2d 631, 633 (judicial efficiency is a primary aspect in ripeness analysis).
91. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 86.
93. See Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Costle, 580 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In the wid-
get-maker hypothetical, the agency may allege that XYZ's harm results solely from the independent
decisions of consumers. See supra note 64.
94. See supra notes 46, 53-55, 61-62 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 67-71 and infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 46, 60-64 and accompanying text.
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jured party's situation and the consequences of the agency's action on
that party's day-to-day business.97 This view takes note that an agency
promulgation may force a party to alter her behavior or anticipate signifi-
cant changes to her business status.98
As noted earlier,99 in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC,"°
the agency's decision essentially precluded B & W from advertising its
"low-tar" brands.' 01 The promulgation forced the manufacturer into a
Hobson's choice of either expending resources to alter market strategy
and thus lose the "low-tar" market share, or possibly facing an enforce-
ment proceeding for failing to comply with the FTC's decision." 2 Thus,
a court may review agency action when a manufacturer, like the hypo-
thetical widget-maker, suffers from an agency's evaluation of its
product. 103
On rare occasions, a court may be unusually willing to find sufficient
ripeness."°4 In Air Line Pilots' Association International v. FAA, 105 the
Fifth Circuit held that subtle agency pressure alone, without any actual
consequences to the claimant's position, satisfied the hardship prong.10 6
The FAA claimed that its "no hazard" finding regarding the construc-
tion of a high-rise complex merely influenced the builder through "moral
97. See Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil and Gas, 792 F.2d 782, 790 (9th Cir. 1986)
("Existence of the Cooperative Agreement forces the Tribes to alter their behavior in significant
ways.").
98. Id. at 790 (hardship prong of the ripeness test satisfied where tribes' land trustee's wrongful
delegation of authority over placement of oil and gas wells on tribal lands significantly changed the
tribes' relationship with the Bureau of Land and Management).
99. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
100. 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
101. Id. at 1172.
102. Id.
103. In B&W, the court said that the plaintiff's hardship compared favorably with that of the
drug companies in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1987), wherein the Supreme
Court granted pre-enforcement review because the challenged action placed the party in a no-win
dilemma. In Abbott Laboratories, an FDA promulgation required that brand-name drug labels dis-
play the name of their generic equivalent. Id. at 152-53. The Court stated:
These regulations [have] a direct effect on the day-to-day business of all prescription drug
companies; its promulgation puts petitioners in a dilemma.... If petitioners wish to com-
ply they must change all their labels, advertisements and promotional materials .... The
alternative to compliance--continued use of material which they believe in good faith
meets the statutory requirements, but which clearly does not meet the regulation-may be
even more costly. That course would risk serious criminal and civil penalties.
Id.
104. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
105. 446 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1971).
106. Id. at 241.
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suasion."' 7 Nevertheless, the court held the effects direct and immedi-
ate because such persuasion is "a considerably potent force in our soci-
ety."' 8 The builders certainly felt the announcement's power, despite
the indirect nature of the decision's effects. Thus, almost any agency
evaluation publication potentially constitutes "moral suasion" when the
impact upon petitioner's business is substantial.
However, courts more often refrain from review when an agency does
not act in a concrete fashion. 109 In Alascom, Inc. v. FCC, 110 the District
of Columbia Circuit stated, "[i]f no substantial hardship to the parties
will result from deferral, a court generally will review an order only
when it can be tested in a concrete factual setting.""' Thus, absent sub-
stantial hardship to the parties, a court generally will defer its review of
agency action.2 A significant hurdle to review may thus exist where
one's hardship is not easily defined.
In Industrial Safety Equipment Association v. EPA,"' the District of
Columbia Circuit stated that even had it determined that an agency-pub-
lished evaluation constituted agency action, ripeness considerations still
would have precluded review." 4 The court characterized the study as a
discretionary agency policy, which courts should leave untouched until
the agency actually applies the policy to a specific fact situation.'
Reviewability also turns on courts' difficulty in analyzing potential in-
jury. 16  In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association v. Kennedy," 7
brand-name drug manufacturers challenged an FDA comparative study
107. Id.
108. Id. The court said that an agency's final "no-hazard" finding would constitute a stumbling
block sufficient to warrant immediate review. Id.
109. See supra notes 73-85.
110. 727 F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
111. Id. at 1217.
112. Id. When agency action is purely legal, and involves no further fact development, however,
the action "may be fit for judicial review even though it has never been applied or enforced by the
agency in a concrete setting." (emphasis added). Id.
113. 837 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
114. Id. at 1119, n.8. The evaluative report's nonbinding nature made it unripe for review. Id.
(citing Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 100, 105-06 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)). A likely key to the court's ripeness determination was the report's express disclaimer
that the EPA did not "desire to impose on the industry [its] recommendations," but only intended
"to urge the public to be more attentive to the asbestos hazard." Id.
115. Id. The report would not alter the agencies' behavior toward the industry members or the
private parties' behavior toward the agencies.
116. See, e.g., Alascom, Inc. v. FCC, 727 F.2d 1212, 1217. ("The mere potential for future
injury.., is insufficient to render an issue ripe for review") (emphasis added).
117. 471 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Md. 1979).
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that found proximate equivalence between brand name and generic
drugs.' Petitioners claimed that consumers, armed with the guide,
would "follow the bargain" and refuse to buy their more expensive,
brand-name products. 1 9 The court countered that consumers purchase
items for various reasons, ' 20 and refused to accept the claimants' unde-
fined potential injury as creating a ripe, reviewable agency action.12'
Thus, reviewability of a published federal agency's industry evaluation
turns primarily on four factors: 1) judicial fear of interfering with ad-
ministrative autonomy; 2) courts' reluctance to grant relief where the al-
leged injury is speculative; 3) courts' fear that judicial economy and
agency efficiency would suffer if the reviewed agency action does not im-
pose legal obligations, fix legal rights, or cause behavioral alterations; and
4) the degree to which review might affect the agency's ability to function
in the future. Thus a court probably would preclude review of the re-
port in the widget industry hypothetical based on one or more of the
above factors.
II. ALTERNATIVE JUDICIAL ANALYSES ALLOWING REVIEW ov
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PUBLICATIONS
An alternative judicial approach advances a strong argument in favor
of granting immediate review. In Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufac-
tures Association (SOCMA) v. Secretary, Department of Health &
Human Services (IIHS),1'2 2 a group of sellers and manufacturers chal-
lenged HHS' classification as carcinogenic' 23 of a component of the chlo-
robenzene-based products they made. The government proposed to
publish the new criteria in its Fifth Annual Report on Carcinogens (the
Report). 124 The plaintiffs alleged that publication of the Report would
118. Id. at 1232. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
119. See Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgement and Injunction at 11, Pharmaceutical
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Kennedy, 471 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Md. 1979) (No. 4-78-2449).
120. 471 F. Supp. at 1232 ("Quite obviously a finding of therapeutic equivalence between two
drugs will not automatically mean that the higher priced drug commodity will no longer be
purchased. For example, the average shopper is no doubt aware of the difference between brand
name cereals and the generally cheaper generic labels, ... but not all consumers automatically opt
for the cheaper version.... Consumers purchase items for all sorts of reasons, although ... price
sensitivity is increasingly becoming a more prominent factor").
121. Id. at 1233. See also Cowdin v. Young, 681 F. Supp. 366, 370 (W.D. La. 1987) ("the mere
potential for future injury is insufficient to render the issues presented ripe for review").
122. 720 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. La. 1989).
123. Petitioners' products ranged from toilet bowl cleaners to moth balls. Id. at 1248.




result in significant harm to sales of their products. 25  The District
Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted review, holding that
publication of the Report constituted agency action within the APA. 126
The SOCMA court framed its analysis in light of the strong congres-
sional presumption ir favor of review 127 and the Supreme Court's deter-
mination that courts must construe "agency action" broadly. 28 In
finding that the Report merited review, the court employed two separate
lines of argument: 1) the Secretary's promulgation of the Report imple-
mented law-by definition constituting a rule subject to judicial review;
and 2) the Report constituted agency action because of its potential
impact.' 29
The court focused first on Congress' intent in enacting the Public
Health Service Act. 130 The Act requires the Secretary to identify carci-
nogenic substances and inform the appropriate agency.131 The court in-
terpreted the Secretary's fulfillment of this mandate as an
implementation of law. Thus the action amounts to the Secretary mak-
ing a rule.132 The APA subjects rules to judicial review.' 3 3 The court
focused on the substance of the action rather than the label the agency
gave it.13 4
The SOCMA court's second line of analysis rejected the agency's con-
tention that its Report did not constitute agency action within the
APA. 35 The court relied on Dow Chemical, USA v. Consumer Product
§ 241(b)(4)(A) (1988). The Act requires the Secretary to publish an Annual Report on Carcinogens
containing a list of chemicals that "either are known to be carcinogens or may reasonably be antici-
pated to be carcinogens ... to which a significant number of persons residing in the United States are
exposed."
125. 720 F. Supp. at 1247. SOCMA sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the
Secretary's criteria for classifying these substances were arbitrary and capricious. Id.
126. Id. at 1249.
127. Id. at 1248. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
128. 720 F. Supp. at 1249. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 238 n.7 (1980) (quoting
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (1946)). See supra note 25. But see supra note 29.
129. SOCMA had standing because the agency's publication would create adverse publicity
about SOCMA members' chemicals and thus would lead to lost profits. Id. at 1247.
130. See supra note 1.
131. 720 F. Supp. at 1249.
132. Id. See supra note 21 for definition of a rule within the APA. See also United States Dep't
of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1151 (5th Cir. 1984) (revised inspection procedure of
DOL constitutes agency action because it was designed to implement law and "an agency act
designed to implement law is by definition a rule").
133. See supra notes 5 and 7.
134. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
135. 720 F. Supp. at 1249-50.
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Safety Commission, 136 which held the Report reviewable "even though it
is never to have any formal effect."' 37 The Dow Chemical court recog-
nized that courts have "become sensitive to the need . . . for judicial
review of federal administrative actions[s] even though [they impose] no
direct obligation [and have no] enforcement effect."' 3 The Dow Chemi-
cal court dismissed the contention that it could not review an interim
agency action as having "the hollow ring of another era."' 3 9
Furthermore, the SOCMA court compared the Report to the "no haz-
ard" determination in Air Line Pilots' Association,""' in which "moral
suasion" sufficed to warrant immediate judicial review.4, Recognizing
what it saw as a recent trend toward judicial pragmatism, the SOCMA
court determined that although HHS intended the Report only to edu-
cate, the plaintiffs deserved judicial review because publication involved
potentially substantial economic hardship for SOCMA members.'42
III. COURTS SHOULD GRANT IMMEDIATE REVIEW
OF AGENCY PUBLICATIONS
Courts should reject the analysis that denies review of an agency's pub-
lished industry evaluation and adopt the line of analysis in SOCMA.
Three basic arguments support reviewability: 1) these "evaluation" cases
strongly resemble reverse-FOIA cases in which courts usually review
agency publications; 143 2) the harm to an affected party from agency
promulgations is often quite direct, immediate, and potentially substan-
136. 459 F. Supp. 378 (W.D. La. 1978).
137. Id. at 386.
138. Id. See also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66-69 (1963) (censorship scheme
struck even where state did not enforce it); Strauss Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001
(1976) (FCC rule on radio station's libelous attack ripe for review even though it imposed no sanc-
tion on the licensee); Continental Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 522 F.2d 107, 124 (D.C. Cir.
1974) ("The action may be reviewable even though ... the agency has not yet put [it] into effect....
[A]gency action may be reviewable even though it is never to have any formal, legal effect") (emphasis
added).
139. 459 F. Supp. at 386 (citing Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
140. 720 F. Supp. at 1249. See supra notes 67-73.
141. 720 F. Supp. at 1249-50 (citing Dow Chemical, USA v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n,
459 F. Supp. 378, 386-87 (W.D. La. 1978)).
142. Id. at 1249-50.
143. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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tial; " and 3) the underlying presumption of review within the APA
itself. 145
A. Reverse-FOIA Suits
In a reverse-FOIA 146 suit, a party who has submitted information to
an agency seeks to block disclosure of that information to a third party
or to the public.'47 In the leading reverse-FOIA case, Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown,'4 the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that a Department of De-
fense decision to disclose data on Chrysler's affirmative action plan,
against Chrysler's wishes, constituted reviewable agency action under the
APA.
14 9
The similarity to the hypothetical widget-maker's predicament is clear.
In both settings, a private party anticipates economic harm from the gov-
ernment's release of certain information. Nevertheless, courts usually
construe the agency's decision to publish as "agency action" within the
APA only in the reverse-FOIA cases. 150
The PMA court spelled out the distinctions between reverse-FOIA
cases and situations like that facing the hypothetical widget-maker: 51 1)
in reverse-FOIA suits the plaintiff seeking to block release of the infor-
144. See supra notes 49-55 and 67-71 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
146. The Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified at 5
U S.C § 552 (1988)).
147. JUSTIN D. FRANKLIN & ROBERT F. BOUCHARD, A GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM Or
INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS § 4.04 (2d ed. 1991). See also William Higgs, Reverse-FOIA
Litigation, 39 WASHINGTON & LEE L. REV. 435, 445 (1982); Eileen J. Berkman, Note, The Reverse-
FOJA Lawsuit: Routes to Nondisclosure After Chrysler, 46 BROOK. L. REv. 269 (1980). The Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) was the result of Congress' effort to prevent agencies from arbitrar-
ily withholding information from the public. Recognizing that the release of certain information
could harm either government or private parties, FOIA exempts some information from mandatory
disclosure, including trade secrets and confidential financial information. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)
(1988).
148. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
149. Id. at 316-18. The Court determined that the Trade Secrets Act, § 7(b), 18 U.S.C. § 1905
(1988), limits agency action, An agency decision to disclose FOIA-exempt material is reviewable
under APA § 702, which provides for judicial review for "person[s] suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). See
supra note 5.
150. Since Chrysler, the matter has been settled. See Humana of Virginia v. Blue Cross, 622
F 2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1980) (Chrysler permits disclosure of medicare program provider's cost
reports).
151. Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Kennedy, 471 F. Supp. 1224, 1229-31 (D. Md. 1979). This
is the only case in which a court has compared and contrasted the two situations.
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mation originally submitted the information to the agency; 152 and 2) only
in the reverse-FOIA situation is the harm sufficiently direct and immedi-
ate to warrant immediate judicial review.' 53 Because these distinctions
are unconvincing, courts should grant review in cases in which an agency
publishes industry recommendations on the same terms as they would in
reverse-FOIA cases.
The distinctions fail to convince because courts view them individu-
ally. By addressing these distinctions separately, courts over-emphasize
the private party's original mistake in submitting the information to the
agency.' 54 At the same time, separate analysis downplays the party's
subsequent injury from the data's dissemination. 55 Taken together,
however, the plaintiff does not care where the agency obtains its data.
Rather, the widget-manufacturer's key concern is that consumer access
to the data will lead it to suffer significant losses.' 5 6 The affected private
party suffers equally in both reverse-FOIA cases and published agency
evaluation situations.
The court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association downplays the
harm plaintiff suffers by saying that in the agency evaluation case all the
information was publicly available through FOIA request. In reverse-
FOIA suits the data at issue was previously exempt from public re-
view.' 57 However, in many other cases a plaintiff may not have had a
choice in the matter. In reverse-FOIA cases, statutes often require that
the plaintiffs submit information to the agency in the first place. 158 Simi-
larly, the widget-maker may have played no role if the agency gathered
its information from in-house study.' 59
B. Effect of Agency Publications on Private Parties
The private party's potential loss resulting from an agency publication
may well be considerable. In PMA, the court described the comparison
152. Id. at 1229.
153. Id. at 1229-31.
154. Id. at 1229. ("Nowhere does PMA allege that it supplied the information proposed for
release in ... the Drug List ... ").
155. Id. ("there is nothing to indicate that the Drug List and Price Guide do any more than list
or compile data...").
156. See supra notes 2 and 17 and accompanying text.
157. 471 F. Supp. at 1230. The information the agency sought to publish was available in the
manufacturer's catalogs and from other public sources. Id.
158. Berkman, supra note 147, at 270.
159. See supra note 100.
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study as purely educational and informational."6 However, as exhibited
in SOCMA, t6 ' Brown & Williamson, t62 and Industrial Safety Equipment
Association,163 reports that agencies intend as educational and informa-
tive often can cause devastating and immediate harm.
Courts sometimes blame a publication's effect on independent con-
sumer decisions, thus denying review and effectively absolving agencies
of liability.' This analysis fails to account adequately for the agency's
responsibility as the prime cause of the party's injury. The agency pro-
mulgation acts as the catalyst; indeed, agencies sometimes attempt to al-
ter an industry's make-up without the threat of judicial intervention. 6
If taken to extremes, the analysis allows an agency to promulgate a
"blacklist," totally isolating an industry or particular manufacturer.' 66
C. Presumption of Review
A further persuasive argument in favor of granting review lies in the
APA's presumption of review: "To preclude judicial review under this
bill a statute, if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its
face give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it." '67
In denying review to most complainants in the hypothetical widget-
maker's situation, courts insufficiently weigh this basic tenet of the
APA's review provisions. While judicial deference to administrative au-
tonomy and the quick dissemination of information are important con-
cerns, courts should recognize the potentially serious effects on private
parties that can result from an agency publication. Courts that grant
160. 471 F. Supp. at 1231.
161. See supra notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 49-55, 87-89 and 100-02 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 38-46, 113-15 and accompanying text. See also supra note 2.
164. See 471 F. Supp. at 1233.
165. See id. at 1225 (plaintiff alleged that the publication of a drug guide was a government
sponsored effort to "remake the existing competitive structure of the prescription drug industry");
Telephone interview with Jim Spoole, Manager, CB North, Charleston, S.C. (member of associa-
tion/petitioner) (February 8, 1991) (alleging that agency attempted to alter makeup of industry
while avoiding judicial review).
166. See, eg., Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 309 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1962). A Canadian
corporation brought suit to require the SEC to strike names of corporations from "Canadian Re-
stricted List." The list, a public press release available to financial publications and newspapers,
contained names of Canadian corporations whose securities the SEC believed to have been distrib-
uted in the United States in violation of SEC registration requirements. Petitioners described the list
as a "blacklist." However, the court found the list purely informational, and not ripe for review
until disputed in an actual case. Id.
167. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d. Sess. 41 (1946).
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review of an agency's published industry recommendations will protect
the widget maker from unwarranted government publications.
IV. CONCLUSION
Agency promulgations of product evaluations carry with them poten-
tially devastating consequences. Traditionally, courts hesitate to review
such publications, and often industry members suffer dramatically.
However, some courts allow judicial review before the parties feel the
sting of agency action. An analogy to reverse-FOIA suits buttresses this
conclusion, as does the APA's underlying presumption of review.
Future judicial consideration should determine that an agency's pub-
lished industry evaluation fits within the APA's definition of "agency ac-
tion," and, despite the admittedly uncertain nature of a complaining
party's injury, should hold these publications ripe for review.
Lawrence A. Walke
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